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Victims of ‘private’ crimes and application  
of human rights in interpersonal relations
ax el l e re i t e r *
I
nternational human rights law has been challenged because of its alleged inability 
to safeguard the rights of the most vulnerable victims of violence. Whereas in real life 
they are often marginalised and effectively left without adequate protection, this is not 
to be attributed to the absence of an appropriate normative framework but rather to the 
contempt, lack of enforcement and systemic neglect of their claims. This paper proposes to 
find a ‘cure’ inside international human rights law, by strengthening the mechanisms that 
permit a horizontal application of human rights standards in private relations. The paper 
is divided in four sections. The first section describes the problematic at hand, focusing in 
particular on violence against women and children. The three subsequent sections then 
analyse the avenues open to victims in order to claim a ‘third­party’ application of human 
rights treaties against non­state actors who have violated their fundamental rights.
Keywords: private crimes, human rights, third­party application, redress. 
Introduction
The paper investigates the horizontal application of international human 
rights  norms  in  interpersonal  relations  between  private  actors,  so  as  to 
provide protection and redress to the victims of ‘private’ crimes. It is divided 
in four sections. The first section describes the problematic at hand and the 
contemporary failure to redress the injustices experienced by vulnerable 
victims, focusing in particular on violence against women and children. The 
three subsequent sections then analyse in depth the diverse avenues open 
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to victims in order to claim a ‘third­party’ application of human rights treaties 
against non­state actors who have violated their fundamental rights; hence, 
providing them with badly needed remedies against the abuses suffered. The 
second section examines the possibility of giving to international human rights 
law a direct effect in interpersonal conflicts before national courts, in line with 
the application of constitutional norms in private law trials. The third section 
builds on the contemporary case law condemning states internationally for 
not protecting individuals against violations of their rights by private actors, 
emphasising the indirect effect of international treaties on private relations. 
Finally, the fourth section studies the direct applicability of international 
human rights law to non­state actors in international or transnational forums 
and domestic trials based on universal jurisdiction. The following analysis 
mostly focuses on the dispositions adopted at the level of the Council of 
Europe, because of the specific position they occupy in the legal systems of its 
member states and the comparative strength of its control mechanisms.
Private crimes, public obstacles and scope of international norms
International  human  rights  law  has  been  challenged,  theoretically 
and in practice, from a variety of contrasting perspectives. One of the most 
damning criticisms of international human rights norms and institutions is 
internal to the human rights paradigm; it targets the alleged inability of the 
international legal order to safeguard the rights and interests of the most 
vulnerable victims of violence and other abuses, in particular those of women 
and children, and in its most extreme variant calls for dismantling the entire 
human rights regime. Since human rights belong to every human being, 
international human rights law must adopt a conceptual framework that 
adequately addresses the needs of all human beings (see e.g. Engle, 1992). 
Regrettably, an abyss separates the high standards that theoretically protect 
the rights of women or children and practical reality.
This challenge is particularly important in relation to the horizontal 
application of human rights norms in inter­personal relations, where their 
most basic rights typically clash with culture, tradition, custom, religion and 
patriarchy. However, whereas in real life these vulnerable victims are often 
marginalised and effectively left without adequate protection, this is not to 
be attributed to the absence of an appropriate normative framework but Temida
57
rather to the contempt, lack of enforcement and systemic neglect of their 
legitimate claims to protection and redress. The problem is largely due to 
states’ deference “to the basic tenets of patriarchy and the legitimacy, if not 
necessity, of violence as a mechanism of enforcing that system” (Copelon, 
1994: 120). Hence, it is important to integrate the relevant international rules 
in all spheres of society, to “prioritise the rights of [the individual] over those 
of the traditionally defined community” and to have them sanctioned by the 
national legal orders (Hossain, 1994: 486­487), to make the state accountable 
when it enables or fails to prevent private abuses (Cook, 1994), and to entitle 
the  victims  to  introduce  judicial  complaints  before  internal  courts  and 
international bodies (Knop, 1994: 159).
While fully acknowledging the urgency of remedying to shortcomings 
of the current system, this paper proposes to find the ‘cure’ inside rather 
than outside international human rights law, relying on the emerging case 
law of international and regional human rights bodies, by strengthening the 
mechanisms that permit an horizontal application of human rights standards 
in relations between private actors. The privileged position of human rights in 
the international legal order has led to their horizontal application to private 
actors. While this phenomenon and ensuing judicial developments do not 
specifically target cases of violence against women or children, they can be 
usefully invoked to effectively advance the claims to redress of the victims. As 
such, they provide a creative answer to the alleged inability of international 
norms  to  account  for  this  particular  type  of  abuses.  Only  states  parties 
to human rights treaties have the obligation to respect the liberties and 
entitlements entrenched in human rights conventions. Yet, the preamble to 
these international agreements and several of their articles imply an absolute 
application of their terms to interpersonal relations. Besides, the supervisory 
organs of the various treaties increasingly refer to states’ positive obligations 
under these conventions. Then, the responsibility of member states can be 
invoked because of their failure to legislate or take other preventive measures 
against private violations and by reason of the judgements of domestic courts 
that legitimise the violations or refuse to compensate their victims.
Invoking human rights provisions against private actions addresses three 
different issues, which are scrutinised in the next three sections. Whilst the 
described avenues have a much broader scope than that of violent acts 
against women and children, these abuses certainly fall under their wider 
protective umbrella. Consequently, the rest of the paper will analyse the Axelle Reiter
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methods available to apply human rights in interpersonal relations in more 
general terms, relying on the underlying idea that all victims of private 
violations can then resort to these methods in order to obtain compensation 
for the infringement of their rights. First, one ought to envisage the possibility 
of  giving  to  international  human  rights  law  a  direct  effect  in  cases  of 
interpersonal conflicts before domestic courts. Secondly, the judicial tendency 
to condemn a state internationally for having failed to protect an applicant 
against violations of her rights by individuals or non­public authorities raises 
the question of the indirect effect of the treaties on private relations at the 
international level. Thirdly, the direct applicability of international human 
rights law to non­state actors in international or trans­national forums cannot 
be neglected, especially after the recent expansion of international criminal 
law and the creation of the International Criminal Court. And domestic trials 
based on universal jurisdiction allow states to prosecute grave human rights 
breaches committed by non­nationals even outside of their territory.
Horizontal application of human rights norms in domestic law
The applicability of human rights conventions to interpersonal relations 
is primarily a concern at the national level, where they are normally raised. 
This practice coincides with the general approach to the question in public 
international  law.  National  courts  and  tribunals  are  the  primary  organs 
entrusted with the competence and power to enforce international norms 
on a daily basis (see e.g. Conforti, 1993). More specifically, the sanction 
of international provisions embodying human rights lies first under the 
responsibility  of  national  judicial  powers.  In  this  light,  it  has  been  put 
forward that the only secure way to guarantee the respect of human rights 
treaties is to delegate the control of their domestic application to municipal 
organs (Sciotti, 1997: 15­16). Even though this last claim appears unlikely, in 
view of the numerous violations of individual rights by public authorities, a 
first monitoring of their respect at the national level can only facilitate the 
elimination of private abuses and ought thus to be welcomed.
The European Convention on Human Rights, without possessing the 
same  force  as  European  regulations,  benefits  from  a  particular  supra­
contractual status in international law. This peculiarity has been confirmed 
by the European Court of Human Rights, in the interstate case opposing Temida
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the Republic of Ireland to the United Kingdom. Called “to clarify the nature 
of the engagements placed under its supervision” by an argument of the 
Irish  government,  the  Court  declared  that,  “unlike  international  treaties 
of the classic kind, the Convention comprises more than mere reciprocal 
engagements  between  contracting  states”  and  that  it  creates  a  set  of 
“objective  obligations  which  [...]  benefit  from  a  collective  enforcement”. 
Furthermore, it touched upon the problem of its applicability to third parties, 
by adding that “the Convention does not merely oblige the higher authorities 
of the contracting states to respect for their own part the rights and freedoms 
it embodies” but “also has the consequence that, in order to secure the 
enjoyment of those rights and freedoms, those authorities must prevent or 
remedy any breach at subordinate levels”.1 Moreover, several articles of the 
European Convention on Human Rights offer a sound foundation for the 
direct effect of this treaty between private persons.
First, the English text of Article 1 disposes that “the high contracting parties 
shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms 
defined in [...] this convention”. The choice of the words ‘shall secure’ rather 
than ‘protect’ or ‘respect’ translates an idea of absolute effect of the liberties. 
Secondly, Article 13 of the Convention recognises that “everyone whose rights 
and freedoms as set forth in this convention are violated shall have an effective 
remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been 
committed by persons acting in an official capacity”. This suggests possible 
breaches of these rights by other persons than public officials. In addition, the 
notion of effective remedy alone obliges states to provide domestic recourses 
to any victim of public or private infringements of her rights. Besides, the 
availability of remedies against breaches of human rights is not only entrenched 
in Article 13 but also in the core of each particular provision. Accordingly, the 
European Court of Human Rights judges that failure to investigate individual 
claims of violations of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention or to condemn the 
persons guilty of these acts constitutes in itself a breach of the Convention, 
independent of their actual perpetration or provocation by state actors.
Article 17 pleads even more fervently for a direct application of the 
Convention  between  private  persons.  By  stating  that  “nothing  in  this 
convention may be interpreted as implying for any state, group or person any 
right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction 
1  ECHR, Ireland v. UK, 18 Jan. 1978, § 239.Axelle Reiter
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of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a 
greater extent than is provided for in the Convention”, Article 17 bans expressis 
verbis al l abu ses of pr o t ect ed fr eedom s and en t it lemen ts b y publ ic and  
private actors alike. This prohibition imposes on individuals the obligation 
to  refrain  from  liberticidal  activities  and  obliges  them,  consequently,  to 
respect the basic rights of other people. Likewise, Articles 6 § 1, 8, 9, 10 and 
11 of the Convention, Article 2 § 3 of the Fourth Protocol and Article 5 of the 
Seventh Protocol admit particular limitations in order to protect the rights 
of others. Subsequently, the rights to public trial, privacy and family life, 
religion, expression, association and assembly, free movement and equality 
of both spouses in relation to their children can solely be exercised in full 
consideration of other persons’ liberties and entitlements.
Finally,  the  wording  of  the  articles  that  consecrate  individual  rights 
decisively argues in favour of an interpersonal application of the Convention; 
by  specifying  either  that  “everyone  has  the  right”  or  “shall  be  entitled 
to” something, or that “no one shall be” the object of a certain abuse. This 
choice of formulation accentuates, instead of states’ obligations, the idea of 
subjective rights opposable to everyone. The 2011 Istanbul Convention, which 
has not yet entered into force, goes even further and provides for changes in 
the perceptions and prejudices of private actors.
A similar application of human rights norms in interpersonal relations 
can  also  be  deduced  from  the  text  of  the  conventions  adopted  by  the 
United Nations and the Organisation of American States, as well as from the 
positions expressed by the organs in charge of monitoring their respect. The 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women constitutes the most activist international text regarding the 
horizontal application of human rights norms in interpersonal relations The 
Preamble of the Convention pleads for a transformation of the existing society 
and the traditional gender roles. This progressive program is confirmed by 
different provisions of the Convention.
Article 2 observes that “states parties condemn discrimination against 
women in all its forms” and “agree to pursue by all appropriate means and 
without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against women”; an 
obligation reinforced by Articles 3 and 24. States are bound to use all available 
means  at  their  disposition  to  suppress  discrimination  by  private  actors. 
They are responsible for breaches of the Convention by individuals, groups 
or organisations and they are supposed to penalise them. In practice, states Temida
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are thus liable to compensate the victims of discrimination and adopt civil 
or criminal penalties against the offenders. In addition, Article 5 requires 
eliminating prejudices and stereotypes, even if they are culturally or religiously 
rooted. In consequence, reliance on established customs and practices cannot 
be accepted any longer as an excuse for failing to defend human rights and 
non­interference with the ‘personal affairs’ of a given community violates 
the Convention. However, this last requirement would benefit from being 
qualified, taking into account the actual experiences, views and perceptions 
of the women living in the targeted communities. Finally, the United Nations 
Committee  responsible  for  the  protection  of  women’s  rights  adopted  a 
general recommendation on violence against women, banning all such acts, 
whether public or private.2
Indirect effect between private persons at the international level
Third party application of international norms is not restricted solely 
to domestic courts and tribunals. On the contrary, it is much discussed at 
the level of the Council of Europe. Whereas individuals may not be cited in 
Strasbourg for violation of other persons’ rights, their breaches of international 
human  rights  law  receive  an  indirect  sanction  by  summoning  the  state 
involved. A double question arises at this level: the obligation of individuals to 
respect human rights, and the corollary issue of states’ international liability 
for infringements committed by their citizens or other people residing on 
their national territory. This second part of the question would then allow, 
indirectly, horizontal application of the Convention, by putting pressure on 
states and forcing them to adopt legislation or take judgements protecting 
private persons from each other. The extent of states’ accountability for the 
deeds of non­public authorities needs to be assessed carefully, though, since 
the actions of some private actors, like terrorist organisations, may prove 
extremely difficult to control, deter or influence.
First  and  foremost,  in  general  public  international  law,  states’ 
responsibility may be engaged not only for actions but also for omissions, 
2  CEDAW, General Recommendation No 19 (11) on Violence against Women, 29 Jan. 1992.Axelle Reiter
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as recognised by several decisions of the International Court of Justice.3 In 
consequence, a state may be found guilty for not having taken all appropriate 
measures to prevent or repress international offences, including breaches 
of human rights norms, and for failing to provide adequate remedy to the 
victims of these crimes. Indeed, as soon as their liability is confirmed, states 
themselves are presumed to have violated the infringed rights. Secondly, 
aside from the classical recognition of states’ international responsibility for 
omissions, the doctrinal theory of ‘state complicity’ establishes that states 
are accomplices and, thus, accountable whenever their domestic courts and 
tribunals tolerate the execution of a contract that includes discriminatory 
clauses (Lauterpacht, 1950: 154­160 and 340­341). Third, due to the wording 
of Article 13 of the European Convention, states cannot escape liability by 
claiming that it was a private person that perpetrated the infraction. Fourth, 
in relation to the most fundamental rights to live and not to be tortured, 
Articles 2 § 1 and 3 of the European Convention foresee the prosecution of 
any infringement of these provisions (see infra). Consequently, it appears that 
states may be judged responsible for individuals’ actions violating human 
rights, though the extent of their liability remains uncertain.
The organs of the Council of Europe have repetitively affirmed that states 
are not merely supposed to abstain from violating fundamental freedoms 
and entitlements but are also required to take positive measures for them 
to be protected effectively, some of which relates to the conduct of private 
persons (see e.g. Warbrick, 1983: 95). The European Court of Human Rights has 
decided that Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention protect rights so important 
that the respect of these provisions imply an effective domestic investigation 
of any claim of their breach. As a result, it is more willing to find a breach of 
the Convention when the domestic investigation of the complaints was either 
inadequate or purely inexistent. In addition, it affirmed that the duty to provide 
an adequate remedy under Article 13 of the Convention requires the institution 
of criminal proceedings in such grave cases and cannot be fulfilled either 
by mere civil action against the state or by simply indemnifying the victims 
or their families. So, the importance of inalienable rights, including those 
enounced in Articles 2 and 3, justifies increased duties under Article 13. And 
this duty of investigation benefits from the same absolute character as states’ 
3  ICJ, Corfu Channel, 9 Apr. 1949, p. 23; ICJ, United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in 
Tehran, 24 May 1980, pp. 31­ff.; ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 11 July 1996, pp. 615­ff.Temida
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negative obligations under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention.4 In particular, 
the European Court of Human Rights condemned the United Kingdom under 
Article 3 for having left unpunished the private mistreatment of children.5
This new interpretation of states’ obligations under the Convention, 
derived from the notion of positive duties, has been praised for its creativity 
and for the importance it attaches to an effective protection of fundamental 
rights in concreto. The assertion that “some human rights violations should 
properly  be  the  subject  of  criminal  proceedings  against  the  individuals 
involved, as opposed to simply civil action against the state which they 
represent” (Livingstone, 1999: 74), coupled with the imposition on public 
authorities  of  the  duty  to  investigate  and  punish  abuses  committed  by 
private individuals, implies that basic rights ought to be fully horizontalised 
and respected by public and private persons alike. In addition, aside from 
state responsibility for private attacks in case of public complicity or official 
complaisance, charges imposed on a government under Article 2 “may also 
imply in certain well­defined circumstances a positive obligation on the 
authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual 
whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another individual”. However, the 
European Court of Human Rights interprets this requisite “in a way which does 
not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities”.6 In 
this context, the Court has traditionally shown reluctance to condemn states 
on the basis of their positive duties under Article 2.
Direct effect between private persons at the international level
In contrast to the now well­established indirect application of human 
rights treaties to private relations, their direct effect between individuals and 
other non­state actors in the international sphere remains largely inexistent. 
Human rights treaties, and in particular the European Convention on Human 
Rights, have been applied directly between private persons in front of domestic 
courts and indirectly through the invocation of state responsibility before 
4  ECHR, Aksoy v. Turkey, 18 Dec. 1996, §§ 97­99.
5  ECHR, A v. UK, req. No 25599/94, 23 Sept. 1998; ECHR, Z et al. v. UK, req. No 29392/95, 10 May 
2001.
6  ECHR, Osman v. UK, 28 Oct. 1998, §§ 115­116.Axelle Reiter
64
international supervisory organs. In contrast, it is usually assumed that they 
may not receive any direct horizontal application at the international level. The 
text of the relevant agreements impose on states international responsibilities 
or legal obligations and only put them under the scrutiny of monitoring bodies, 
for the respect of their duties under the treaties they have signed. However, 
this affirmation needs to be seriously qualified and elaborated upon, in view of 
the current developments in international criminal law. The recent explosion of 
supranational criminal enforcement mechanisms, including the extensive case 
law of the two ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda and the creation of the International Criminal Court, has changed 
the situation at this level as well. Another question to be considered in this view 
is the universal jurisdiction of municipal courts and tribunals over international 
crimes, including grave human rights violations that qualify as crimes against 
humanity. As a result of these parallel developments, the prospects for a direct 
application of human rights norms in interpersonal or other private interactions 
have significantly improved.
The Inter­American Court of Human Rights addressed this question in its 
advisory opinion concerning states’ international responsibility for laws that 
violate the Convention. First, the Court recognised that “international law may 
grant rights to individuals and, conversely, may also determine that certain 
acts or omissions on their part could make them criminally liable under that 
law”. Then, it added that “at the present time individual responsibility may 
only be invoked for violations that are defined in international instruments as 
crimes under international law, such as crimes against peace, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity or genocide, which, of course, also affect specific 
human rights”; and that, what regards those crimes, “it is of no consequence 
that they are committed by enforcing a law of the state to which the agent or 
official belongs”, since “the fact that the action complies with domestic law 
is no justification from the point of view of international law”. Thus, “as far 
as concerns the human rights protected by the Convention, the jurisdiction 
of the organs established thereunder refer exclusively to the international 
responsibility of states and not to that of individuals”. Nevertheless, “if these 
violations were also to constitute international crimes, they would, in addition, 
give rise to individual responsibility”.7
7  ACHR,  International  Responsibility  for  the  Promulgation  and  Enforcement  of  Laws  in 
Violation of the Convention, 9 Dec. 1994, §§ 51­57.Temida
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Most human rights conventions do not foresee actively any punishment for 
private actors who violate the rights of other individuals. Yet, supervisory organs 
have dismissed these people’s claims to protection by declaring their applications 
inadmissible, under Article 35 § 3 of the European Convention, Article 3 of the 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and 
Article 47 of the Inter­American Convention, on grounds of incompatibility with 
the provisions of these treaties or of abuse of the right to petition.8 They have 
also rejected them as abusive under Article 17 of the European Convention, 
Article 5 § 1 of the Covenant and Article 29 (a) of the Inter­American Convention.9 
In addition, they interpret the scope of protected freedoms and entitlements 
in a manner compatible with the respect of other people’s rights. Accordingly, 
the European Court of Human Rights considered that the only ‘philosophical 
convictions’ that qualify as such are those that are worthy of protection in a 
democratic society and, hence, respectful of human dignity.10
A perfect and complete direct horizontal application, at the international 
level, would require a modification of the texts of most human rights treaties 
or the adoption of new additional protocols. In any event, the necessity of 
such a development remains questionable in the light of the actual jamming 
of the Strasbourg process by the high number of vertical applications. Besides, 
the combination of existing control mechanisms already allows international 
judges to press domestic authorities to apply international human rights 
norms in inter­individual disputes, by condemning states whose judiciary does 
not recognise them such direct effect. Of course, this does not guarantee that 
states will obey the international case law or that violators will be punished. 
Concerning this last point, it should be reminded, though, that the primary 
purpose of human rights treaties is the protection of fundamental freedoms 
and entitlements ex ante, rather than the punishment ex post of the persons 
or authorities guilty for their violation. Lastly, some international conventions 
already have a direct horizontal effect and allow bringing individuals on trial 
8  EComHR, Ilse Koch v. FRG, 8 Mar. 1962, pp. 134­137; ECHR, Volkmer v. FRG, 22 Nov. 2001; ECHR, 
Petersen v. FRG, 22 Nov. 2001.
9  ECHR, Witzsch v. FRG, 20 Apr. 1999; ECHR, Schimanek v. Austria, 1 Feb. 2000; ECHR, Garaudy 
v. France, 24 June 2003; ECHR, WP et al. v. Poland, req. No 42264/98, 2 Sept. 2004; ECHR, 
Norwood v. UK, 16 Nov. 2004; ECHR, Witzsch v. FRG (2nd case), 13 Dec. 2005; HR Committee, 
JRT and the Western Guard Party v. Canada, 6 Apr. 1983; HR Committee, MA v. Italy, req. No 
117/1981, 10 Apr. 1984.
10  ECHR, Campbell and Cosans v. UK, 1982, §§ 36­37; ECHR, Refah Partisi v. Turkey, 31 July 2001, 
§ 52.Axelle Reiter
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either before international bodies or before domestic courts and tribunals, by 
relying on universal jurisdiction clauses. These solutions could be extended to 
cover human rights violations by private actors, including ‘private’ crimes.
Conclusion
Private  violations  of  individual  rights  present  a  challenge  for  the 
international legal order and its traditional focus on state actions. Yet, the 
main function of international human rights law is to effectively guarantee 
individual  freedoms  and  entitlements  against  abuses,  whether  they  are 
committed by public agents or private persons. In this perspective, human 
rights conventions are general instruments of protection of the norms that 
delineate the limits of interpersonal relations and not simply the rules that 
regulate the behaviour of state actors. Accordingly, international human rights 
law ought to be considered by national courts and tribunals when they judge 
interpersonal disputes, as well as by other public authorities that adjudicate 
conflicting claims. In the absence of domestic control over the respect of 
fundamental freedoms and entitlements, states may be held internationally 
responsible for the private abuses that the lack of enforcement of their 
positive obligations under international law has facilitated. On top of this, 
all international organs condemn the failure to properly investigate claims 
related to grave human rights abuses and to provide adequate remedies to 
their victims as distinct violations of these provisions.
Most of the gravest violations of individual liberties are directly sanctioned 
at  the  supra­national  level  by  international  bodies  and  are  included  in 
the material scope of universal jurisdiction. To begin with, human rights 
supervisory organs consider that international treaties only protect basic 
rights as long as they are not exercised in a detrimental fashion and reject 
other claims as if they were out of their scope or declare them inadmissible. 
In addition, universal jurisdiction clauses have been introduced in several 
relevant  international  agreements.  These  legal  developments  provide 
evidence of the direct application of human rights as side constraints on all 
actions, independent of the public or private character of the agent. Whereas 
few cases dealing with specific breaches of women and children rights by 
private persons have been judged following such lines, a more systematic use 
of these avenues would greatly improve their ability to obtain redress.Temida
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ax el l e re i t e r
Žr  tve „pri  vat  nih“ zlo  či  na i pri  me  na ljud  skih pra  va  
u me  đu  ljud  skim od  no  si  ma
Me  đu  na  rod  no pra  vo ljud  skih pra  va je ospo  re  no zbog na  vod  ne ne  spo  sob  no  sti 
da za  šti  ti pra  va naj  ra  nji  vi  jih žr  ta  va na  si  lja. Iako su u stvar  nom ži  vo  tu oni če  sto mar­
gi  na  li  zo  va  ni i za  pra  vo osta  vlje  ni bez ade  kvat  ne za  šti  te, to se ne sme pri  pi  sa  ti od  su­
stvu od  go  va  ra  ju  ćeg nor  ma  tiv  nog okvi  ra već ne  po  što  va  nju, ne  do  stat  ku spro  vo  đe  nja 
i si  ste  ma  tič  nom za  ne  ma  ri  va  nju nji  ho  vih pra  va. U ra  du se pred  la  že da se pro  na  đe 
„lek“ unu  tar me  đu  na  rod  nog pra  va ljud  skih pra  va, ja  ča  njem me  ha  ni  za  ma ko  ji do  zvo­
lja  va  ju ho  ri  zon  tal  nu pri  me  nu stan  dar  da ljud  skih pra  va u pri  vat  nim od  no  si  ma. Ovaj 
rad je po  de  ljen na če  ti  ri de  la. Pr  vi deo opi  su  je tre  nut  nu pro  ble  ma  ti  ku, fo  ku  si  ra  ju  ći 
se na  ro  či  to na na  si  lje nad že  na  ma i de  com. Tri odelj  ka, ko  ja po  tom sle  de, ana  li  zi  ra  ju 
op  ci  je ko  je sto  je na ras  po  la  ga  nju žr  tva  ma ka  ko bi mo  gle da kao „tre  ća stra  na“ pod­
ne  su tu  žbu za kr  še  nje ljud  skih pra  va pro  tiv ne­dr  žav  nih su  bje  ka  ta ko  ji su pre  kr  ši  li 
nji  ho  va osnov  na pra  va.
Ključ  ne re č i :  pri  vat  ni zlo  či  ni, ljud  ska pra  va, pri  me  na tre  će stran  ke, obe  šte  će  nje.